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An earlier version of his post was originally published on Eva Balogh’s Hungarian
Spectrum blog on 21 March 2020.  It has been updated to reflect the situation as of
29 March 2020.  
Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán never lets a crisis go to waste.  On 20 March,
late on a Friday afternoon, he put before the Hungarian Parliament a law that would
give him dictatorial powers under cover of declaring a state of emergency to fight the
coronavirus.  The law has been ably translated into English here.  
Orbán sought an expedited procedure to ram through this law when the Parliament
opened on Monday 24 March.  The opposition united and denied Orbán the 4/5ths
vote he needed to pass the law without the requisite parliamentary procedure.  
But the coronavirus emergency law – called by its critics the “Enabling Act” with all
that implies – will be voted on by the Parliament in the coming week, probably on
Tuesday 31 March.  The law will need 2/3rds of the Parliament to pass, given that
the law has constitutional implications.   But Orbán has those votes.  
Hungary is on the edge of dictatorship     
The law creates two new crimes.   Anyone who publicizes false or distorted facts that
interfere with the “successful protection” of the public – or that alarm or agitate that
public – could be punished by up to five years in prison.   And anyone who interferes
with the operation of measures that the Hungarian government takes to fight the
pandemic could also face a prison sentence of up to five years, a punishment that
increases to eight years if anyone dies as a result of the interference.  
While the law barring false or distorted facts may appear to be reasonably aimed at
spreading malicious disinformation in a crisis, Orbán’s terrible track record on press
freedom creates the suspicion that the law is aimed at attacking the last remnants
of an independent press in Hungary.  It may well even sweep in foreign journalists
reporting from Hungary.   Already, state-controlled media whose messages echo
the government are baying for their independent competitors to be punished for
deviating from the party line.   
  The second new crime would punish those who break mandatory isolation orders
or otherwise challenge what the Orbán government is doing to fight the virus.   This
power could well be used to sweep up anyone who violates a curfew or challenges
what has become an increasingly controversial use of the military in domestic affairs.
  The Hungarian government declared a draconian curfew on Friday 27 March.  This
followed an order a week earlier for army units to deploy to 84 strategic factories to
ensure their continued operation.  And more extreme measures are to come.  The
crime included in the Enabling Act is written broadly enough to sweep in critics who
challenge whether the government is acting sensibly or even whether a measure
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that the government is taking has any relationship to the virus at all.   It is up to the
government to determine what “obstructs” the implementation of its emergency
program.   
Both new crimes would give the public prosecutor, a firm friend of the prime
minister’s, huge discretionary power to detain anyone who challenges what the
government is doing in the name of the threat.   The Orbán government has a 10-
year track record of using prosecutorial power to benefit his friends and hurt his
political enemies, so such discretionary powers in the hands of the public prosecutor
are especially worrisome.   
These two new crimes would not be, strictly speaking, emergency powers.  They
would be permanent changes to the criminal law.   They would not go away when
the emergency is over.  
Alarming though those new crimes are, the provisions of this law that implicate
separation of powers are even more disturbing and would end the appearance
of constitutional and democratic government.   (The reality of constitutional and
democratic government ended some time ago, but appearances were maintained.)  
 
Under this pending emergency law, Orbán would govern alone.
The law would give Orbán a free rein to govern directly by decree without constraint
of existing law.    He could “suspend the enforcement of certain laws, depart from
statutory regulations and implement additional extraordinary measures by degree.” 
  (Sec 2.)   The law is no more specific than this, implying that any law could be
suspended or overridden as long as the emergency continues.   
In short, it doesn’t matter what any law in Hungary says today.  This week, if this
pending bill becomes law, any existing Hungarian law could be overridden at
Orbán’s whim.  
The Hungarian Parliament, citing an abundance of caution, has already decided
not to meet for the foreseeable future after it finishes this business.  What happens
when the Parliament is no longer around to hold Orbán to account?  This new law
spells it out:  The government shall provide information about what it is doing to the
speaker of the Parliament and the leaders of the parliamentary party groups, but
the Parliament may not act to counter any measures taken by Orbán.  (Sec. 4).   In
short, the Parliament will be sidelined by the government in the state of emergency. 
 
The Hungarian Fundamental Law once built reasonable checks into its emergency
powers, but those checks would be circumvented by this emergency law.   While
the constitution requires that the Parliament be able to veto an emergency, the
pending emergency law asks Parliament to endorse Decree 40/2020 through which
Viktor Orbán first declared an emergency on 11 March, and it also asks Parliament
to endorse every other decree that the Prime Minister has or will have issued from
his first emergency decree on 11 March through until the moment that the new
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emergency law is signed by the president.   (He is currently up to decree 71/2020
and counting.)   The Parliament would be therefore be writing a blank check that
endorses all of these decrees plus any new decrees that the Prime Minister shovels
into the National Gazette (Magyar Közlöny) before the loyal Hungarian President
signs the coronavirus emergency law.   We all need to keep our eyes on that
publication to see what new authorizations sneak onto the books in the coming days.
   
But the crucial point is that Orbán is asking the Parliament in this law for a pre-
endorsement of anything he does – and he does so in a way that makes it much
harder for the Parliament to change its mind later.   To rein in Orbán’s emergency
powers once it has endorsed them, Parliament would have to pass another law
overturning the decrees that it has already endorsed.   Since the coronavirus
emergency law is a so-called cardinal law because it affects constitutional
provisions, it would have to be passed by a two-thirds vote, but also repealed
by a two-thirds vote.   And if the Parliament decides it has given away too many
of its powers and manages to muster the two-thirds to repeal this law, Orbán’s
close political ally, the Hungarian President, could simply refuse to sign it.   The
emergency provisions in the constitution allow the Parliament to end a state
of emergency in a simple resolution.  The pending law effectively cancels that
safeguard by requiring Parliament to suspend emergency decrees in a law. 
(A technical point for those who want to look more closely:  Section 3 of the law is
the most dangerous part.   But why it’s dangerous isn’t obvious.  Parliament is given
the power in Section 3.2 to withdraw the authorization of the emergency decrees set
out in Section 3.1.  That makes it sound like there is a safeguard for the Parliament
to cancel the state of emergency.   But then all of the decrees that are mentioned in
Section 3.1 are repeated in Section 3.3 with the additional 31-and-counting “blank
check” decrees included by implication there.    The decrees listed in Section 3.3
are not covered in the permission given in Section 3.2 to Parliament to withdraw its
support from the emergency decrees.  The overwhelming bulk of the decrees are still
extended indefinitely under the operation of Section 3.3.  Bait and switch.)
Could anyone legally challenge this emergency law or any government action taken
under it?  As I write, the trial-level courts in Hungary have already been suspended
out of fear of spreading the virus, and if the ordinary courts are closed, no ordinary
person can initiate a case that could get to the Constitutional Court.   There are
some other political actors who could take a case directly to the Court invoking
abstract review but Orbán controls all of those offices.  Though the Constitutional
Court is required by the Hungarian Fundamental Law to remain open through an
emergency (and the pending law makes much of honoring this “guarantee”), it
is hard to see how any case could get to the Constitutional Court in the present
moment.  The only possibility is that one-quarter of the Parliament, a number that
would require the far-right and the left to act in concert, could challenge this law or
decrees endorsed by it.  But that is unlikely even now. 
In any event, the Constitutional Court has been a reliable rubber stamp for Orbán
since it was captured in 2013, so no one expects serious constraints on the Prime
Minister to issue from those quarters even if were possible to generate a case for the
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Court to consider.   The appearance of the Constitutional Court in this emergency
law appears to put a rule-of-law stamp on the whole special legal regime, but that is
all for show.  
It gets worse.   For the duration of the emergency no elections may be held.  Not
byelections if a member of parliament succumbs to the virus.  Not local elections
even if a local government is dissolved.  Not regular elections if the emergency
lasts that long.  No elections at all.   And no referenda either.   Democracy is in
suspension for the duration.  
And the emergency has no end date.   The constitution specifies that the emergency
must end when the crisis ends, but the determination of that moment is left to the
prime minister.   
In short, Orbán’s emergency gives him everything he ever dreamed of:  The absolute
freedom to do what he wants.   
Of course, reality does have a way of undermining dreams, and Orbán may find that
his are no different.  
Governments all over the world are using emergency powers to deal with the very
real threats posed by COVID-19.   In most cases, those emergency measures
have been tailored to fight a pandemic and are appropriately limited and checked. 
  The measures in the Hungarian law are so sweeping and unlimited that they do
not appear to be tailored to the battle that in fact must be fought.   Why is Orbán
giving himself unlimited powers now?    I suspect it is because he knows better than
anyone that the coronavirus crisis in Hungary will be exceptionally severe.
Hungary is more vulnerable than most countries in the developed world because its
health care system was in a state of near collapse even before this virus appeared
on Hungary’s doorstep.  The underfunded and understaffed hospital system may
well fall into dysfunctional chaos with even a mild outbreak of this virus in the
country.    And that would be a real emergency.   The threat of coronavirus in
Hungary is serious and Orbán no doubt knows that the country is not ready to handle
it.   
Even before Hungary has very many cases, the inability of the Hungarian health
care system to handle a real pandemic is clear.   Already, the last remaining
independent press outlets in Hungary are reporting a coronavirus death rate at
4.19% of detected cases, higher than anyplace else in the region except northern
Italy, which is recording 9.26% following the collapse of its health care system.   But
the Hungarian figures were from 23 March, when Hungary only had 167 reported
cases.    Imagine what will happen when these numbers climb to the thousands and
tens of thousands.  Already, the deputy chief of mission from the UK to Hungary
has died of the disease, completely puzzling unless you know how overstretched,
underfunded and ill-supplied Hungarian hospitals are.    More deaths will surely
follow.   Orbán can clearly see that the health care system in Hungary is already
failing under even the smallest pressures, and this is just the beginning.  
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Orbán’s emergency law does nothing to strengthen the Hungarian health care
system.   (Some of the decrees issued since the law was published do – but not all.) 
  This new emergency regime instead gives Orbán powerful tools to use when and if
the virus takes a toll in Hungary and the citizens of the country rebel at the avoidable
losses that his government should have protected them against.  With these new
emergency powers, Orbán would have the power to lockdown his own population
with draconian decrees backed by force.  The law hands to Orbán the fully-fledged
dictatorial powers he would need in order to cling to office when the full weight of the
pandemic hits.  
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